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Introduction
Although we know much more now than we did 50 years
ago about autism, the nature, origin and even the defi-
nition of the condition are still debated and remain largely
unknown. This special issue begins with a review of the
facts about autistic disorders, as they are known at
present. In their introduction, Elizabeth Hill & Uta Frith
(2003) remind the reader that autism is no longer
regarded as a rare disease. They provide examples of gen-
etic and brain research that targets the biological causes
of autism and they review the three major cognitive
theories that are currently used to explain the core signs
and symptoms of autism. Much more is known now about
autism than was known only a few years ago, and there is
justified hope that our understanding of autism will con-
tinue to accelerate at a fast pace. This issue contains
examples of the cutting edge of research and highlights
some of the most burning questions. Some of these relate
to the diagnosis of Asperger syndrome (AS), the identifi-
cation of subgroups in the autism spectrum and early signs
of autistic disorder. Other questions relate to the brain
abnormalities that underlie the putative cognitive deficits
and whether these can be made visible through magnetic
resonance imaging. The shared assumption among the
contributors is that autism is a neurodevelopmental dis-
order that gives us a unique window on the relationship
between mind and brain. The research reported elaborates
the key theories that have been put forward to explain the
signs and symptoms of autism. These theories try to
explain the selective impact of brain abnormality on some
of the most high-level mental functions, such as social
insight, empathy and information processing style.
One of the puzzles presented by the autistic disorders
(which we will term ‘autism’ for short) is that the inability
to communicate with others can coexist with high intellec-
tual function. This puzzle has been part of the core
description of autism since the beginning, and particularly
so in Hans Asperger’s early descriptions. When he first
described a handful of cases of what he termed ‘autistic
psychopathy’, little could he have imagined the impact on
theory and practice. The criteria for AS are currently the
subject of hot debate. It is ironic that the present definition
of AS, as an autism spectrum disorder without early lang-
uage and cognitive delay, may be based on a mis-
understanding of Asperger’s own definitions. However,
Asperger’s own definitions have been shrouded in obscur-
ity. Kathrin Hippler & Christian Klicpera (2003) retraced
the clinical case records of 74 of Asperger’s original cases.
For the first time, we have available the catalogued infor-
mation detailed in these case reports. One finding is that
while many of the cases that Asperger diagnosed would
still be classified in the same way, a quarter of his cases
would now be diagnosed with autism, according to the
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criteria adopted by both the World Health Organization
and the American Psychiatric Association. Furthermore,
Hippler and Klicpera’s findings suggest that it may be the
high verbal abilities of those with AS that allow them to
achieve an apparently greater degree of social awareness
than is achieved by those diagnosed with autism. How-
ever, then, as now, it is clear that high intelligence does
not preclude severe impairment in everyday social adap-
tation, and that the social impairment typical of autism is
largely independent of intelligence and surprisingly inde-
pendent of language ability.
How productive is it to continue with research aimed
at explaining the whole of the autism spectrum? Given the
enormous heterogeneity of the spectrum, perhaps the time
is ripe to reconsider the possibility of new subgroups.
Ideally, such groups do not just capture relatively super-
ficial distinctions in terms of overt behaviour, but distinc-
tions that relate to distinct neurological causes. Whether
new subgroups confirm historical distinctions is another
question. Helen Tager-Flusberg & Robert Joseph (2003)
used the profile of performance on cognitive tests to estab-
lish neurocognitive phenotypes, which, in turn, they have
related to brain size and organization. They show how it
is now possible to strengthen our understanding of autism
by integrating the use of several sensitive neuropsycholog-
ical techniques at our disposal. By drawing on similarities
with children with specific language impairment, which is
diagnosed in the presence of significant language difficulty
and in the absence of other cognitive impairments, Tager-
Flusberg and Joseph identified one autistic subgroup with
overlapping specific language impairment. Furthermore, a
group of boys with autism had reversed brain asymmetry
similar to that reported previously in boys with specific
language impairment. The other distinct subgroups ident-
ified by Tager-Flusberg and Joseph showed a large dis-
crepancy between verbal and non-verbal IQ. In cases
where the discrepancy was in favour of verbal IQ, the con-
dition tended to be milder. In cases where it was in favour
of non-verbal IQ, autism was more severe, and only this
group was characterized by larger head size. Larger head
size in autism has recently emerged as an important find-
ing, and correlates with brain size and weight. This differ-
ence suggests that different aetiologies may be revealed in
the two subgroups.
Impairments in the domain of social communication are
the most striking feature of autism, and language impair-
ments would be expected to aggravate these difficulties.
However, impairments in gaze-following could be even
more fundamental and provide the common denominator
between children with both high and low language abili-
ties. It is already known that children with autism do not
necessarily look towards the same direction that another
person is looking. Normal children tend to do this because
they seem to wish to share another person’s attention.
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develops rapidly from 6 to 12 months of age. Joint atten-
tion involves the triadic coordination, or sharing, of atten-
tion between the infant, another person and an object or
event. Looking at another person and pointing to a cup
to request a drink, or looking at another person and point-
ing to a toy to share enjoyment, are examples of this skill.
Lack of joint attention is one of the earliest signs of autism.
Tony Charman (2003) highlights the crucial role that joint
attention plays in autism, delineating its component parts
further in the youngest longitudinal cohort yet studied. He
discusses the psychological and neurological processes
that might underlie the impaired development of joint
attention and confirms that it is one of the earliest mani-
festations of mentalizing failure. One of Charman’s most
important findings is that impaired joint attention does
not predict repetitive behaviour at later ages. By contrast,
individual differences in joint attention ability are associa-
ted with language gains and social and communication
skills at later ages. Thus, it may be futile to search for a
unifying account for all of the currently specified behav-
ioural criteria of autism, which include repetitive behav-
iour as well as social and communication impairments.
Following another person’s direction of gaze is a volun-
tary action, but there is also an involuntary tendency to
follow eye gaze, a kind of reflex. One highly interesting
hypothesis is that this reflex is absent in autism. This
hypothesis has been tested by John Swettenham et al.
(2003) with clear and negative results. These authors
investigated whether an observer would be affected by the
direction of moving eye gaze of a face. Would the observer
be induced to look into the same direction as the face
when this gaze did, in fact, give no useful information as
to the location of a target that the observer was instructed
to look at? The direction of seen eye movement provided
an involuntary cue even for children with autism. This
new finding suggests that a missing attentional reflex is
not the reason why individuals with autism fail to follow
eye gaze voluntarily and fail to engage in joint attention.
In blind children, the absence of the visual modality
would certainly preclude the use of eye gaze to monitor
another person’s direction of attention. The importance
of the visual channel for developing this ability is shown
by the fact that congenital blindness is associated with a
raised incidence of autism, and tends to produce some
social impairments that are reminiscent of autism. Peter
Hobson & Martin Bishop (2003) report on their long-
standing investigations of a group of children with con-
genital blindness but without the diagnosis of autism.
They pose the question of whether visual impairment is a
source of the social difficulties and to what extent these
difficulties (however they originate) have an intrinsic con-
nection with other autistic features in these children.
Intriguingly, autistic features are much more pronounced
in some children than in others, and it is the comparison
between these groups that is the major concern of Hobson
and Bishop’s paper. By directly observing the social inter-
actions of blind children, Hobson and Bishop suggest that
one reason why congenital blindness may predispose an
individual to autism lies in the nature of the experience of
two-way interactions.
However, there is another low-level perceptual process
that could be at fault: the normally innate preference for
faces and eyes may be missing in autism. This hypothesis
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is developed and tested in the paper by Ami Klin et al.
(2003). There is good evidence that even well-compen-
sated individuals with autism experience difficulty with
everyday social interactions in a variety of ways, even when
their performance on laboratory tests of social cognition
appears flawless. These individuals still experience diffi-
culties in peer interaction and are unlikely to have close
friends. Klin et al. (2003) ask what it is about social situ-
ations that high-functioning individuals with autism find
difficult to process. They answer this question in a novel
attempt to investigate naturalistic performance. Klin et al.
synthesize the findings of their recent studies in which they
have adopted a new technique—eye tracking—to monitor
the approach of individuals with autism to finding mean-
ing in naturalistic social scenes. While being able to pro-
duce, verbally, the rules of social interaction (such as
explaining what a pointing gesture means), the individuals
with autism studied in this paper were unable to translate
this information into spontaneous social interaction. Such
findings lead the authors to propose an alternative way
of viewing social cognition, which they term ‘embodied
cognition’, an emerging neuroscience approach to cogni-
tive development.
Possible deficits in very high-level cognitive processes
are considered by Simon Baron-Cohen et al. (2003). Suc-
cessful social interaction involves a need to empathize (the
term ‘empathizing’ is here used to include mentalizing)
and this is contrasted to an ability to ‘systemize’—a drive
to analyse or construct systems. Having developed two
scales to assess empathizing and systemizing, Baron-
Cohen et al. contrast the performance of adults with high-
functioning autism or AS and a normal population on
these two measures. Not only does a male–female differ-
ence exist on these measures in their normal sample
(favouring males on their systemizing quotient and
females on their empathizing quotient), but individuals
with autism also showed an unusually strong drive to sys-
temize. These findings reflect the different pattern of
interests of individuals with autism. Could these different
interests arise because the normal preference for social
stimuli in the environment cannot be presumed? This
would correlate well with Klin et al.’s hypothesis. The
approach provided by Baron-Cohen et al. starts to provide
methods for the much-neglected area of adult assessment
and, with further development, these questionnaires could
be useful tools for wide population screening. Further-
more, the systemizing and empathizing quotient instru-
ments could have potential importance for the broader
phenotype. It is still an empirical question whether empa-
thy and mentalizing ability correlate strongly with the
degree of social interest and whether low social interest is
a necessary, if not sufficient, prerequisite for a diagnosis
of autism.
Of course, it is not just areas of social interaction that
are unusual in the individual with autism. Aside from a
cognitive explanation of autism relating to these difficult-
ies, two further cognitive theories of autism—central
coherence and executive function—are also widely
acknowledged. Clinically, children and adults with autism
often show a preoccupation with details and parts, while
failing to extract gist or configuration. This cognitive style
of weak central coherence has been usedto refer to a num-
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and linguistic processes. In an original and methodolog-
ically rigorous attempt to elucidate the mechanisms that
can give rise to weak central coherence effects, Kate
Plaisted et al. (2003) postulate that these mechanisms may
be perceptual and examine these through the use of visual
configural and feature discrimination tasks as well as an
auditory filter task. Their findings of enhanced feature dis-
crimination and abnormally broad auditory filter widths
in autistic children suggest that while perceptual pro-
cessing in autism is abnormal, this abnormality does not
impact on the postperceptual processes responsible for
integrating perceptual information to form a configural
representation. Their work identifies areas in which the
central coherence account requires modification, and suggests
the potential for integrative studies of peripheral perceptual
processes, central cortical processes and computational
studies to identify the mechanisms underlying the abnor-
malities of stimulus processing associated with autism.
The relationship between weak central coherence and
a third cognitive theory of autism, executive dysfunction,
remains unclear. Rebecca Booth et al. (2003) provide an
incisive investigation of their relationship by comparing
boys with autism with boys from another clinical condition
that is also believed to be associated with executive dys-
function: attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. Parti-
cipants were asked to draw objects with specific items
included (e.g. a house with four windows). These draw-
ings were analysed in such a way that it was possible to
see whether they focused on a small detail, and whether
they showed lack of planning. Booth et al. found evidence
that both groups of boys showed planning impairments
in comparison with a normally developing control group.
However, only the boys with autism showed a detail-
focused drawing style, as predicted by the theory of weak
central coherence. These results indicate that weak coher-
ence may be a cognitive style that is specific to autism and
not secondary to deficits in frontal functions.
A new and valuable approach to the neuropsychological
impairments in autism may be through the study of motor
coordination. Individuals with autism show delays in
achieving motor milestones, soft neurological signs and
difficulties with motor imitation, among other motor diffi-
culties. Very little is known about the extent of such diffi-
culties within the autistic population. Having developed
an innovative reach-to-grasp movement paradigm,
Morena Mari et al. (2003) show differences in movement
planning and execution in what they term low-ability chil-
dren with autism in comparison with normally developing
control children. Their paradigm provides evidence that
movement disturbances may play an intrinsic part in
abnormal neurophysiological processes in at least a sub-
group of individuals with autism. The movement abnor-
malities that these authors found show striking parallels
to Parkinsonism. Given the apparent heterogeneity of the
autistic condition and the difficulties that this presents for
unifying explanations of the disorder, Mari et al.’s para-
digm may make it possible to identify a particular neuroc-
ognitive subtype of the disorder in the future.
Research on the brain in autism is currently undergoing
a rapid phase of development and very little is currently
known about brain development in autism. One of the
more prominent theories about the brain in autism is the
amygdala theory, although the evidence to date is equivo-
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cal. Claire Salmond et al. (2003) have investigated this
theory by comparing the presence of structural neuroana-
tomical abnormalities in the amygdala with behavioural
evidence for amygdala dysfunction. They tested the
emotional modulation of the startle response in children,
a response known to be dependent on the amygdala in
adults, but found no significant group differences. Surpris-
ingly, only half of the children with autism showed struc-
tural abnormalities in the amygdala, whereas, in all
children, abnormalities in a variety of other brain regions
were identified. This highlights the heterogeneity of the
disorder and may pave the way to subtyping at the brain
level.
In the final paper of this issue, Robert Schultz et al.
(2003) provide a vital contribution to an understanding of
the network known as the social brain. In a study in which
they focus on the fusiform face area (FFA)—an area of
the brain that has previously been shown to be involved
in the processing and discrimination of faces—Schultz et
al. show that this is not the only role of the FFA. Rather,
it is engaged in social processing in general and is part of
a well-established set of brain regions that are specific to
social cognition. These include the amygdala, superior
temporal sulcus and medial prefrontal cortex. Critically,
in their study, the strength of activity across normal parti-
cipants in the region of the FFA during social attribution
was related to the accuracy with which they performed the
task. This suggests that hypoactivity of the FFA in autism
may be a reflection of a core social brain network underly-
ing the disorder. Clearly, in the future we can look forward
to further studies correlating structural and functional
brain activity with the behavioural signs and symptoms
of autism.
In the past ten years, research on autism has undergone
a period of consolidation, with empirical work guided by
the three major cognitive theories—theory of mind, central
coherence and executive function—and with cognitive
explanations of the core features of autism providing a
vital interface between brain and behaviour. The varied
papers in this issue demonstrate that new ideas on how
to link mental dysfunctions and brain abnormalities are
emerging, facilitated by the use of new techniques. More
is becoming known about the brain basis of autism and
the nature and variability of its behavioural symptoms. We
are also becoming more aware of the earliest signs of
autism and about persistent difficulties, even in well-
compensated adults. Last, but not least, the cognitive
strengths of individuals with autism are finally being
recognized and seriously examined.
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Uta Frith
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